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Abstract
Cognitive approaches to religious phenomena have attracted considerable interdisciplinary atten-
tion since their emergence a couple of decades ago. Proponents offer explanatory accounts of the
content and transmission of religious thought and behavior in terms of underlying cognition.
A central claim is that the cross-cultural recurrence and historical persistence of religion is attribut-
able to the cognitive naturalness of religious ideas, i.e., attributable to the readiness, the ease, and
the speed with which human minds acquire and process popular religious representations. In this
article, we primarily provide an introductory summary of foundational questions, assumptions, and
hypotheses in this field, including some discussion of features distinguishing cognitive science
approaches to religion from established psychological approaches. Relevant ethnographic and
experimental evidence illustrate and substantiate core claims. Finally, we briefly consider the
broader implications of these cognitive approaches for the appropriateness of ‘religion’ as an
explanatorily useful category in the social sciences.
1. Introduction
One way to characterize the history of epistemology and metaphysics is to recount the
penchant of philosophical speculation to spawn empirical sciences. The catch, however, is
that as those sciences mature, they return to commandeer intellectual domains on which
philosophy had previously presumed to possess a proprietary claim. Ironically, this process
by which philosophy has managed to limit its own purview is a direct consequence of
philosophers’ insistence on rational, disciplined inquiry. We ask philosophical proposals
for greater precision and detail and press them to square with, to organize, to illuminate,
and, ultimately, to inspire new discoveries about the world. What the birth of modern
science brought were means for meeting such demands that are far more systematic, more
efficient, and more penetrating than any devised before. The collective accomplishments
of communities of scientific experts fostering theoretical competition, discovering empiri-
cal evidence, and constantly monitoring the credibility of that evidence has proved far
more effective at producing fruitful accounts of the world than isolated speculations in
philosophy, where assessments, far too often, have turned on nothing more than appeals
to common sense, suggestive anecdotes, and the canons of logic.
Religions involve presumptions about agents who allegedly possess counter-intuitive
properties, i.e., properties that violate humans’ automatic, universal ontological assump-
tions, such as a person possessing the ability to walk through walls or to live eternally or
to hear prayers from all over the world. Traditional projects in metaphysics, epistemology,
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and the philosophy of religion offer familiar means for handling such materials. They
address questions about the properties of such agents, the plausibility of such configura-
tions of properties in agents, the evidence for the existence of agents with such proper-
ties, and the status of linguistic usage pertaining to all of this. But, finally, most of these
philosophical undertakings address aspects of religion’s conceptual infrastructure rather
than anything very directly connected with popular religious belief and practice.
In contrast, naturalists focus on explanatory theories of religion. Naturalism in philoso-
phy demands that philosophical proposals exhibit a healthy respect for the methods and
findings of the empirical sciences – especially when those philosophical proposals address
the same domains those sciences do. Where, then, might a science of religion begin?
Prima facie, religion looks like a topic for which the social sciences and cultural anthro-
pology, in particular, are most appropriately suited, and dominant explanatory theories in
these disciplines would serve as perfectly proper points of departure. The problem,
however, is that, for the past 30 years, cultural anthropology has favored interpretive over
explanatory approaches to culture. Suffice it to say, formulating empirically testable
theories that address explanatory questions has not been a high priority. Those cultural
anthropologists who have retained a vision of the discipline’s scientific mission have
suggested that students of culture look to its psychological foundations, where explanatory
theorizing and experimental testing have thrived during exactly the same period. See, for
example, Sperber’s (1975). Subsequent research along these lines has indicated that the
cognitive and psychological sciences offer valuable resources for explaining components
of culture, including religion.
In this article, we explore the core theoretical assumptions of the new cognitive sci-
ence of religion (CSR) and some of the resulting hypotheses. CSR has emerged in the
past two decades as an interdisciplinary and explanatory approach to religion, focusing on
the cognitive foundations of religious beliefs and practices, and, in particular, on recur-
rences and variations of patterns across cultures. We begin by contrasting the field with
established approaches to the psychology of religion and specifying what is distinctive
about CSR’s empirical purview. The remainder of the article reviews both theoretical
proposals that have been offered to account for the form and spread of religious belief
and practice, and some illustrative case studies of empirical work in the area. For a com-
plementary introduction to specific programs of research, we refer the reader to Justin
Barrett’s recent review of the empirical literature (2007).
2. Cognitive Science of Religion
At its core, religion seems to involve individual experience. Such individual-level phe-
nomena appear to provide a natural opening for a psychology of religion. Yet, for a host
of reasons having to do with their character, their eliciting conditions, their special cul-
tural status, and more, religious experiences do not readily submit to the standard tech-
niques of psychological experimentation. In the seminal text in the area, The Varieties of
Religious Experience, William James takes a different approach. He catalogs an enormous
assortment of experiences reported in the history of religions, examining and evaluating
numerous explanatory proposals, and advancing hypotheses of his own. James’ shadow
has loomed over subsequent work on religion within experimental psychology. Sorting
through materials like the immense collection James surveys has occupied and inspired
generations of researchers. Much of that work, however, retains two features of James’
approach from which contemporary cognitive theories diverge.
The first is James’ presumption that religious experience is fundamentally affective:
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... you suspect that I am planning to defend feeling at the expense of reason, to rehabilitate the
primitive and unreflective...
To a certain extent I have to admit that you guess rightly. I do believe that feeling is the deeper
source of religion, and that philosophic and theological formulas are secondary products. (James
1902 ⁄1929, 422)
Cognitivists diverge not because they reject these claims. Barrett and Keil (1996), Slone
(2004), and Tremlin (2006), for example, suggest that the ‘theologically correct’ religious
conceptions that people affirm during their offline, conscious reflection substantially differ
from the much more anthropomorphic representations that they deploy in their intuitive,
moment-to-moment, online reasoning. The former far exceed the latter with respect to
both the number of counter-intuitive features that they incorporate and the inferential
difficulties that they present. Nor do cognitivists hold that religious emotions are irrele-
vant. They do argue, however, that explanations that focus on emotion will be unable to
make much sense either (i) of the religious convictions of the substantial percentage of
religious people who have not experienced any peculiarly religious emotion, or (ii) of the
forms that their religious representations take.
This leads directly to a second front on which contemporary cognitive theorists diverge
more drastically from James’ approach. At the outset of The Varieties, James declares:
I speak not now of your ordinary religious believer, who follows conventional observances...
His religion has been made for him by others, communicated to him by tradition, determined
to fixed forms by imitation, and retained by habit. It would profit us little to study this second-hand
religious life. We must make search rather for the original experiences which were the pattern-
setters to all this mass of suggested feeling and imitated conduct. (1902 ⁄1929, 7–8, emphasis
added)
James holds that most everyday religious experience is but a pale imitation of the origi-
nating experiences of the religiously gifted. This may be true, but if it is so, then, cogni-
tivists would argue, James himself has provided grounds for skepticism about the
relevance of the originating experiences to an enhanced understanding of conventional
religious patterns, which are ‘communicated... by tradition, determined to fixed forms by
imitation, and retained by habit.’ On James’ own account, it is those processes that shape
and inform the vast majority of people’s religious experiences, beliefs, and practices. James’
strategy of studying the varieties of (extraordinary) religious experience constantly risks
doing so at the cost of its relevance to studying (and explaining) most religious experience.
In contrast to James’ approach, then, cognitivists examine both cognitive and affective
dimensions (as opposed to affective dimensions only) of commonplace (as opposed to
extraordinary) patterns of religious experience, cognition, and conduct.
Taking inspiration from Sperber’s (1996) proposals, first, that culture is usefully under-
stood as a combination of distributions of public representations in the world and distri-
butions of mental representations in populations of human minds and, second, that its
study, therefore, can be usefully understood (at least in part) as an epidemiology of beliefs,
cognitive scientists of religion examine the cognitive and psychological predilections of
human minds that shape just those processes of cultural transmission to which James
alludes but to which he gives much less attention. These researchers (such as Boyer 1994,
2001, 2003; Barrett 2000, 2004; Atran 2002; McCauley 2003) hold that religious forms
are by-products of domain specific psychological capacities that have arisen on the basis
of considerations that neither have anything to do with religion nor with one another
(see also Pyysia¨inen and Hauser 2010).
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In contrast to Sperber’s epidemiological model, some theorists have proposed straight-
forwardly evolutionary accounts to explain religious beliefs and practices. Some (such as
Bulbulia 2004 and Bering and Johnson 2005) argue that psychological proclivities for
forming religious representations enhanced individual fitness in complex social settings.
Others (Wilson 2002 and Sosis and Alcorta 2003) maintain that religion is an adaptation
at the level of groups. Still others (e.g., Dennett 2006) maintain that religious ideas are
best understood as memes and that it is a process of selection at the memetic level that
determines religions’ fates.
Although contributors to the CSR have advanced assorted theories about an array of
religious phenomena and their origins, all champion the promise of the methods and find-
ings of the cognitive sciences for enhancing our understanding of religion, and all maintain
that religious thought and action turn overwhelmingly on harnessing perfectly ordinary
forms of cognition available to all normally equipped human beings. Religious representa-
tions and practices rely on garden-variety cognitive capacities, which develop quite natu-
rally in every normal human being. Thus, accounting for religious belief and conduct
requires neither employing special methods nor postulating distinctively religious faculties.
Early works in this field looked to theoretical strategies from the various cognitive sci-
ences, including cognitive psychology, linguistics, and evolutionary psychology, so as to
formulate new theories about a wide range of religious materials.1 Works exploring the
consequences of those theories include new experimental research in psychology and
anthropology2 on religious cognition as well as examinations of these theories’ abilities to
make sense of a wide variety of materials from diverse religious systems in other places
and other times.3 Works advancing new cognitive hypotheses include proposals about
sacred texts, about magic, about the connections between religion and morality, and
about the character of theological variation.4
In contrast to well-established approaches in the psychology of religion, then, recent
cognitive theories of religion concentrate
(1) on the similarities among the mental representations that people possess concerning
religious materials,
(2) on cognitive explanations of those similarities, and
(3) on the implications of those cognitive theories for the explanation of religious belief
and practice as well as features of religious systems.
3. How Religious Cognition Works
Cognitive theories of religion do not hold that the mind contains a specific module for
religion. Instead, most hold that religion exploits a diverse collection of cognitive incli-
nations in the minds of human beings that enjoy neither a logical nor a psychological
unity. The upshot of this analysis is that, cognitively speaking, religions are like a Rube
Goldberg devices, which is to say that they are exceedingly complicated contraptions
calling on all sorts of psychological propensities that are, otherwise, usually unlinked
(McCauley 2003). The standard features of religious mentality and conduct are cobbled
together from the susceptibilities of a disparate compilation of psychological dispositions5
that typically develop in normal human minds for very different reasons – both from
one another and from anything having to do with religion.
These psychological dispositions develop because the resulting mental dispositions they
undergird served our ancestors well in dealing with a host of problems their physical and
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social environments presented, just as they continue most of the time to serve us well
when we deal with the same problems. These various mental capacities and their sponta-
neous operations conferred adaptive advantages on the organisms that possessed them.
They include abilities to detect agents and recognize individual conspecifics, and to read
their minds from the expressions on their faces. Whether or not these capacities begin as
dedicated, task specific systems, many end up seeming to operate that way as a result of
standard cognitive development. Comparatively early in human development, the mind
responds to some stimuli (facial, social, linguistic, etc.) instantly, automatically, and unre-
flectively. The resulting knowledge is overwhelmingly intuitive and any underlying prin-
ciples that might be guiding such behavior – if such principles there be – involve implicit
knowledge, which is to say that they generally operate below the level of consciousness.
Frequently, the cuing of these systems and their mental dispositions engenders powerful
feelings in human beings as well as characteristic intuitions and behaviors. Consider, for
example, the feelings and behaviors associated with the perception of contaminated food
or with the inability of an informant to make eye contact or with inequitable distribu-
tions of resources on the basis of self-interest. All other things being equal, the human
beings in each of these scenarios typically experience distinctive feelings that can instantly
propel them into characteristic behaviors – here, acts and attitudes of avoidance, suspi-
cion, and complaint, respectively.
But how do such systems, abilities, and dispositions outfit human beings for religion?
One core proposal, offered by Pascal Boyer and others (Atran 2002; Barrett 2004), is that
systemic features of modern human cognition have rendered human minds susceptible to
generating and retaining a variety of representations, beliefs, and practices that presume
particular counter-intuitive arrangements. These concepts do not wholly conform to our
instant, automatic, unreflective expectations, but rather violate these expectations in inter-
esting and attention-grabbing ways. A person walking by may attract our attention.
A person flying by is virtually guaranteed to do so. Such attention-grabbing representa-
tions include Smokey the Bear, talking wolves that can plausibly be mistaken for
grandmothers, and Superman; beliefs in everything from Santa Claus, fairies, and lepre-
chauns to ghosts, ancestors, angels, and gods; and practices such as theater and ritual.
However normal it may seem, a moment’s reflection reveals how striking it is that
humans have no problem conceptualizing Mickey, Minnie, Donald, and Goofy talking,
having pets, and going on picnics. Nor are the counter-intuitive representations that
human beings readily process confined to non-standard agents. Not only could Mighty
Mouse fly, he produced contrails, which could function like ropes to bind up bad guys
(who, incidentally, were almost always cats who had five-o’clock shadows, wore dark
clothes, smoked cigars, and drove cars).
We return below to the question of what makes these representations religious, but
needless to say, not all counterintuitive concepts are religious (by any definition). They
abound in folk tales and fiction as well as in cartoons, comic books, and commercials.
They are also sometimes one of the marks of lunacy. So, as Boyer and others argue, this
is not an exclusive or complete story about religious cognition, but it is an important part
of it.
Although the limited catalog of templates that counterintuitive concepts exhibit recurs
across cultures, the precise contents of particular counterintuitive representations is mostly
a function of what is in the air locally. So, for example, representations of agents with
counterintuitive psychological properties are recognizably widespread, if not universal, in
human culture, and their emergence, stability, and spread are amenable to general explan-
atory accounts in terms of the generic features of human minds. Finer-grained cultural
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particulars about the specific form the agent takes, and the precise nature of his or her
counterintuitive psychology, biology, or physicality, are informed by social, historical,
ecological and other factors and contingencies of the local environment. Explaining how
these factors jointly contribute to patterns of cross-populational variation and recurrence
of cultural forms is a major challenge for the emerging cognitive science of culture.
Cognitive theorists offer at least three complementary lines of analysis about how
counter-intuitive representations that we regard as religious come about. The first two
concentrate on their origins, the first and third on their persistence. Inspired, in part, by a
long tradition of intellectualist theorizing in anthropology that holds that humans enter-
tain religious beliefs because they help explain things, the first line of analysis6 maintains
that when humans confront anomalous phenomena, i.e., phenomena that violate their
intuitive expectations, they generate counter-intuitive representations to make sense of
these states of affairs. (Although plenty of theorists have made much of dreams, they are
not the central issue here.) Surprising, unexpected experiences that resist ready explana-
tion engender the construction of otherwise unexpected, counter-intuitive representations
to make sense of them. Our default hypothesis for explaining unexpected sounds (espe-
cially in the dark) is that they have resulted from some agent’s actions (and we begin
searching for the agent responsible). The force of the associated emotions and intuitions
is such that it is a very small step cognitively to explanations of the unsuccessful searches
in terms of empirically undetectable agents. Representations of agents possessing counter-
intuitive properties arise, in effect, as the result of such cognitive false alarms.
In supportive cultural settings, such experiences are just as capable of stimulating what
we may come to deem scientific speculations as religious ones. Science, however, inevita-
bly advances proposals that are much more counter-intuitive than those religion recruits
(McCauley 2000). Science invariably traffics in representations that arise from genuinely
extraordinary variations on our standard mental contents. So, for example, sooner or later,
the physical and biological sciences have come to abandon appeals to the thoughts and
actions of agents. One firm correlate of scientific progress has been its steadily increasing
restriction of the domains in which appeals to the thoughts and actions of agents are
acceptable explanatory tools.7 To explain things, religions, in contrast, rely on the states
of mind and actions of a variety of agents.8
The ranges of conditions capable of activating the mental dispositions we have been
discussing do not infallibly correlate with the objective conditions that led to their devel-
opment. The cues that trigger these systems’ operations woefully underdetermine the
inferences they automatically draw (whether those inferences are drawn consciously or
not). An unexpected sound in the dark can prompt us to search for the agent that (we
assume) made it. A picture of a pair of eyes pasted on a wall will suffice to improve par-
ticipants’ conformity to an honor system (Bateson et al. 2006). Permitting false positives,
these systems are not perfect detectors; thus, they err on the side of liberality. Probably,
the most obvious illustrations are the non-stop illusions we experience when watching
films or television – from our effortless inferences about people, places, and things to our
feelings of motion sickness on the basis of nothing more than how our brains routinely
process the visual inputs that arise from changes in the illumination of a 2D surface before
us. The second line of analysis9 within the CSR highlights how religions the world over
assume forms that capitalize on the fallibilities of such dispositions. Because every normal
human being is susceptible to such emotionally compelling, cognitive misfires (in a vari-
ety of domains), persisting religions include all sorts of public representations capable of
stimulating these false-positive responses by activating the relevant perceptual systems –
from fashioning simple human-like objects that incorporate visual cues suggesting the
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presence of additional agents10 to producing glossolalia that includes auditory cues sug-
gesting the presence of significant speech. Cohen 2007, for example, describes the fairly
typical case of a member of an Afro-Brazilian religion whose religious journey began
with the frequent sound of footsteps, which the adept described as ‘like that of a man, a
really tired man, who used to hang around me. But I never saw him, I only listened –
just a child’ (191). To this young mind, all evidence pointed to there being a person
responsible for the noises that she readily identified as footsteps. As Cohen observes, ‘The
fact that, until then, her entire experience of persons indicated that the property of physi-
cality was normal did not stop her from thinking that this person was factual. Indeed,
since person-agency was so undeniable, only such a being could be responsible’ (192).
Two general questions remain. First, why do only some of the representations that false
alarms provoke get transmitted? And, second, why do some, but not others, among those
that do persist, count as religious? We shall touch briefly on the second question in the
final section, but, for now, we shall turn to the third line of analysis11 in the CSR, since
it focuses on the first of these two questions.
Cognitive scientists of religion explain the similarities among people’s religious repre-
sentations by focusing on how human cognition influences the ways that these represen-
tations emerge and spread. Those pursuing the third line of analysis, however, specifically
examine the selection pressures that humans’ cognitive dispositions and susceptibilities
exert – particularly in the process of cultural transmission – on the forms and contents of
religious representations. On this account, how such counter-intuitive representations
originate is not the critical issue. The more important question is why some of these rep-
resentations continue to get transmitted and why some are more faithfully transmitted
than others. The answer, in short, is that selective forces operating in transmission hone
religious representations’ forms and cognitive appeal. Just as humans find some foods par-
ticularly good to eat, they find some cultural representations – as Claude Le´vi-Strauss
suggested – particularly good to think.
Humans tend to transmit representations when they have the following properties.
First, as the second line of analysis stresses, appealing representations are readily recogniz-
able. For example, physical structures that manifest symmetry along a vertical axis are rare
in nature (outside of the animal kingdom) but abundant in culture.12 Structures of this
sort with two plausibly positioned spots resembling eyes seize humans’ attention particu-
larly effectively.
Second, Boyer has argued that representations are more likely to get transmitted if they
achieve a balance between their ability to grab attention and to underwrite cost-free infer-
ences. Representations with many counter-intuitive properties, for example, an invisible
armchair that is the offspring of crocodiles, that can read people’s minds, but that only
remembers people’s thoughts about gumdrops for more than a day, may attract attention
but with so many violations of intuitive ontological assumptions, it is incapable of moti-
vating many inferences. Learning, in contrast, that some agent controls the wind and the
rain is attention grabbing, but it also automatically permits inferences that this agent has
goals, desires, and preferences, that it can be persuaded to do things, that it finds some
attitudes and behaviors offensive, that it is disinclined to help anyone who manifests such,
and so on. Most popular religious representations often involve but a single violation of
humans’ ontological assumptions. This minimal counter-intuitiveness of cross-culturally
widespread religious forms (in contrast to the radically counter-intuitive representations
that the sciences and elaborate theologies trade in) approximates an ideal balance between
the ability to seize humans’ attention and the ability to authorize inferences for free
(McCauley 2000).
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Such an arrangement constitutes a cognitive optimum not only because it achieves this
balance but because it facilitates memory as well. This is the third critical property. If a cul-
tural representation is easily remembered, that will add to its cognitive appeal. Boyer and
Ramble (2001) have provided cross-cultural, experimental evidence that indicates that the
minimally counter-intuitive representations with which religions deal (such as gods who
are invisible) are also more readily and more accurately recalled than ones that are simply
unusual but not counter-intuitive (such as a chocolate table), or ones that are massively
counter-intuitive (such as the psychic, gumdrop obsessed, crocodilian arm chair noted
above),13 or, we would add, representations such as those that the sciences routinely gen-
erate (from gravity, electro-magnetic fields, and anti-matter to implicit memory, change
blindness, and distributed representation). McCauley and Lawson (2002) have argued that
persisting cultural representations, especially in non-literate settings, provide important
insights about the character of human memory (See Bartlett 1932). For example, people
tend to remember rhythmic verbal formulae that rhyme14 and culturally significant rituals
that arouse the emotions.
Fourth, like some diseases, such representations are readily communicable. Frequently,
the features that make a representation memorable will also make it easier to transmit.
Usually, tunes are unforgettable precisely because they are so easy to sing, hum, or whis-
tle. In contrast, representations like those in science or in formal theology that possess
none of these features, that are complicated and detailed, and that trade in unfamiliar
concepts are far less likely to get transmitted, let alone faithfully so.
Finally, these representations often motivate people to spend their time and energies
transmitting them to other people. If we believe God is the secret to happiness and
human fulfillment and we want those whom we care about to have happy, fulfilled lives,
then we will tend to transmit representations about God to those whom we care about.
Or if part of some idea is that rewards will accrue to those who propagate that idea, this
will increase the probabilities that it gets propagated.
The crucial point, however, is that all three of these cognitive accounts presume that
the eruption of religious representations in human populations relies neither on a
uniquely religious set nor even on any integrated set of sensibilities or cognitive capaci-
ties. Instead, religion (along with such things as civil ceremonies and superstition, fantasy
and folklore, and music and magic) largely results from the latent consequences of normal
variation in the operations of fallible perceptual and cognitive heuristics enshrined in
human minds that otherwise aid us in managing problems from a wide array of
domains.15
All of the above points concerning the cognitive influences on the emergence and
spread of religious representations are testable against experimental, ethnographic, and his-
toriographical data. Evidence supports the claims, for example, that concepts that have
readily recognizable components, that achieve a cognitively optimal balance between
attention-grabbing novelty and cost-free inferences, that are easily remembered, that are
readily communicable, and that motivate communication will have an edge in cultural
transmission over concepts that fail to meet these criteria. Recent ethnographic and
experimental work in the CSR has strengthened the empirical foundations of these
claims. In Section 4, we offer a necessarily brief illustration of this work concerning a
particular religious form that is both widespread and ancient in human culture – namely,
spirit possession – with specific reference to Cohen’s cognitively informed ethnographic
study with Afro-Brazilian religionists. The ethnographic literature to which this study
contributes testifies to the ‘cognitive naturalness of religion’ even for domains of thought
and practice that are often categorized as ‘ecstatic’ and extraordinary. Careful analysis of
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the everyday elicitation, use, and spread of different kinds of spirit possession concepts
reveals that cognitively optimal concepts (according to the criteria outlined above)
out-compete more complex concepts in cultural transmission.
4. An Illustration: Spirit Possession
The idea that disembodied agents possess the bodies of living human and animal beings
recurs across cultures and historical epochs. Cultural universality and historical persistence
strongly suggest that such ideas are ‘good to think with’ and readily communicable. Until
recently, however, explanatory analyses of possession have focused disproportionately on
the biological basis of trance behavior that often accompanies the eclipse of agency typi-
cally thought to occur in possession episodes. Some of the earliest anthropologists sought
answers to cognitive questions about the generation and spread of such ideas of spirits,
souls, soul flight, and possession, but at that time could only remark ‘There has arisen an
intellectual product whose very existence is of deepest significance, a ‘‘psychology’’ which
no longer has anything to do with ‘‘soul’’’ (Tylor 2006, 501). As we have shown in the
previous sections, the emergence of the cognitive sciences in the second half of the
twentieth century has enabled anthropologists to return to such questions, applying new
methods and a new set of conceptual and theoretical tools. So, why are possession
concepts so persistent? Let us consider each of the five criteria mentioned above in turn.
4.1. SPIRIT POSSESSION CONCEPTS LARGELY EMPLOY READILY RECOGNIZABLE COMPONENTS
Fundamentally, widespread possession ideas concern configurations among familiar, every-
day entities - bodies and agents. Typically, a bodiless agent, or spirit, effectively displaces
an agent (the ‘host’) from his or her body and takes control of the body. The conceptual
entities in possession – agents and bodies – and the notion that agents animate and act
through their bodies are basic elements of everyday social cognition. Successful possession
concepts capitalize on this familiarity by maintaining largely intact intuitive assumptions
about agents, bodies, and the relationships between them.
4.2. SPIRIT POSSESSION CONCEPTS ACHIEVE A BALANCE BETWEEN GRABBING ATTENTION AND
UNDERWRITING COST-FREE INFERENCES
The conceptual building blocks of successful possession concepts are intuitive and familiar
and may effortlessly generate inferences that might be considered mundane in everyday
social causal reasoning, e.g., about why the (possessed) person is walking over there, talk-
ing to that person, etc. Possession concepts also diverge from everyday normality, how-
ever, by positing the replacement of the usual host agent with another agent, and
inferences must be drawn accordingly. The possibility that someone might look like the
Tom or Mary we all know, but actually be a completely different person is powerfully
attention grabbing and consequential for one’s behavior (especially if Tom or Mary is
one’s spouse, boss, parent, etc.). Unsurprisingly, this specific element is particularly dra-
matized in popular portrayals of possession in film and media, and in fantastical thrillers
and comedies about mind swaps and mind control (e.g., Freaky Friday). Alternative con-
cepts of possession exist in the ethnographic record, entailing, for example, the merging
of the spirit and the host within the host’s body. Although there is little reason to sup-
pose that these ideas attract less attention than more widespread alternatives (e.g., con-
cepts entailing complete displacement of the host by the spirit), their ability to generate
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cost-free inferences appears to be greatly inferior. The Afro-Brazilian participants in
Cohen’s research, for example, only ever attributed the behavior of a purportedly pos-
sessed person to either the spirit or the host (e.g., if possession was in doubt), and never
to a fusion of both entities.
4.3. SPIRIT POSSESSION CONCEPTS ARE EASILY REMEMBERED
Cross-cultural survey, ethnography, and experimental evidence suggest that possession
concepts are best remembered when they exploit intuitive assumptions about agents, and
agent–body relationships. For example, Cohen and Barrett (2008b) have provided evi-
dence suggesting that concepts that deviate from everyday assumptions about the nature
of agents and the relationship between mind and body are more poorly recalled than
concepts that are aligned with basic mind–body expectations; possession concepts that
blend familiar assumptions about agents and bodies with a specifically displacement concept
of possession (i.e., the host agent is effectively displaced by the possessing agent) are better
remembered than alternative, more cognitively complex concepts (e.g., that host and
spirit agencies fuse and ⁄or simultaneously control the host’s body). This experimental evi-
dence is corroborated in Cohen’s ethnographic research and in the ethnographic record
generally.
4.4. SPIRIT POSSESSION CONCEPTS ARE READILY COMMUNICABLE
The ready communication and recall of concepts of agent-displacement appear to be
facilitated by implicit assumptions that minds and bodies operate, at least in part, indepen-
dently of one another, such that persons may change while bodies remain the same, and
vice versa. Indeed, glib attributions of possession are commonly made and readily under-
stood (even if not believed) outside of explicitly religious contexts, such as when a person
acts out of character. Similar notions are implicit in phrases such as ‘he’s not himself
today’ or ‘she’s out of her mind’. Although some possession concepts (e.g., the ‘fusion’
version mentioned above) are not easily communicated, requiring repetition and the use
of metaphor (whereby familiar concepts are elicited and likened to new concepts), cogni-
tively optimal concepts literally seem to come almost for free, requiring little explicit
communication. Revision of these concepts in favor of alternative cognitively cumber-
some concepts requires considerable cultural support (see Cohen 2007 and Cohen 2008).
4.5. SPIRIT POSSESSION CONCEPTS MOTIVATE TRANSMISSION
That one’s body is periodically taken over by another agent is not something that is easily
concealed from relatives, friends, and even employers. Spirits in many possession religions
have a habit of arriving unexpectedly and announcing who they are, and, like anyone,
prefer to be addressed as themselves. The motivation to spend time and energy transmit-
ting ideas about possession is not just bred of necessity, however. Possession concepts are
often part of a broader ideology (theological, political, historical) that frames and enhances
the significance of possession experiences. Possession, therefore, can mean many things,
even within a single cultural context and across various phases of the lifespan, and these
meanings variously motivate transmission in forms of personal testimony, proselytizing
rhetoric, support for novice adepts, and so forth. Possessing spirits, for example, are often
believed to assist hosts in the resolution of existential concerns having to do with health,
safety, family, employment, etc. The cognitive simplicity of possession concepts
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combined with their contextualization within episodes of profound existential significance
fosters the successful transmission and persistence of these concepts in culture.
5. Whither ‘Religion’?
Finally, and in conclusion, we consider the second question raised earlier. Why do some
but not all persisting counter-intuitive representations count as religious representations?
Perhaps, one of the most interesting implications of CSR for the study of religion is the
suggestion that this query already begs a critical question, viz., whether there is, any
longer, a principled basis for delimiting a subset of our representations as the ‘religious’
ones (See Cohen forthcoming). If, cognitively speaking, human religiosity is a Rube
Goldberg device, what, then, are the scientific grounds for identifying specific socio-
cultural phenomena as religious? Because human religiosity is a hodgepodge at the
psychological level, are religions – construed at the socio-cultural level – comparable
miscellanies? Is ‘religion’ a viable, analytical category for social science?
The cognitive approaches reviewed here suggest some grounds for skepticism about
the conceptual glue that purportedly holds the outcomes of our diverse dispositions and
susceptibilities together in distinct, socio-cultural systems that the term ‘religion’ denotes.
It appears that theorists in the social sciences must bear the burden of demonstrating the
respects in which ‘religion’ is an explanatorily useful category to stave off the suspicion
that, like concepts such as ‘weed’ or ‘constellation’, it only delineates superficial (indeed,
accidental!) patterns that reveal little or nothing about the phenomena it designates, but
only something about the perspective humans are inclined to take on these things prior
to reflecting about them theoretically.16
The piecemeal approach that characterizes the CSR is a direct consequence of the
‘naturalness’ thesis. This new explanatory approach develops from the recognition that
features of human thinking and behavior that we commonly think of as religious have
many divergent properties. Explaining religion is not a matter of accounting for a single
trait, nor of accounting for divergent traits in terms of the same sets of underlying factors.
An account of the persistence and spread of spirit possession concepts, for example, may
thus tell us very little about the patterns of socio-political arrangements and coalitional
dynamics that recur across organized institutions. The success with which the CSR
explains such diverse phenomena in the coming decades will undoubtedly turn as much
on the creative development of novel methodological and conceptual tools for a better
science of society as on the continued borrowing of valuable resources from the cognitive
and psychological sciences for the study of religious cognition.
Short Biographies
Robert N. McCauley is a philosopher of psychology and cognitive science whose work
has focused on cross-scientific relations. He is also a cognitive scientist of religion, who
has written primarily on religious ritual and the cognitive foundations of religion. In con-
nection with the former projects, he has published papers in Philosophy of Science, Synthese,
Philosophical Psychology, the Blackwell Companion To Cognitive Science, and the Elsevier
Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. He has published work on
cognition and religion in the Journal of Cognition and Culture, Journal of the American Acad-
emy of Religion, Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, and History of Religions. In their
two books, Rethinking Religion (Cambridge, 1990) and Bringing Ritual to Mind
(Cambridge, 2002), he and E. Thomas Lawson have argued for pursuing a CSR and
Cognitive Science and the Naturalness of Religion 789
ª 2010 The Author Philosophy Compass 5/9 (2010): 779–792, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00326.x
Philosophy Compass ª 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
advanced a cognitive theory of religious ritual competence. Comparing the cognitive
foundations of science and religion, he brings his two research profiles together in a new
book nearing completion, to be entitled The Naturalness of Religion and the Unnaturalness of
Science. He has received grants or fellowships from the American Council of Learned
Societies, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the Lilly Endowment.
McCauley is William Rand Kenan Jr. University Professor and Director of the Center
for Mind, Brain, and Culture at Emory University.
Emma Cohen is an anthropologist and post-doctoral researcher in the Comparative
Cognitive Anthropology research group (CoCoA), Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary
Anthropology (Germany) and Psycholinguistics (Netherlands). She is also affiliated with
the School of Anthropology and Museum Ethnography, University of Oxford, and has
received grants from the British Academy and the John Templeton Foundation. Her
research concerns the cognitive and cultural factors influencing patterns of cross-cultural
recurrence and variability in human thought and behavior. Combining ethnographic and
experimental methods, her work has focused on various forms of religious ideas and prac-
tices, including spirit possession, sorcery and witchcraft, divination, and afterlife concepts.
In The Mind Possessed (OUP 2007), Cohen developed a radical new approach to explain-
ing the transmission of spirit possession ideas and practices, based on recent discoveries in
the cognitive sciences and on long-term fieldwork with a group of Afro-Brazilian spirit
mediums in Brazil. Her research also investigates how children and adults across different
cultural contexts intuitively reason about the relationship between bodies and minds.
Currently, she is implementing cross-cultural and developmental research projects on
cooperation and social bonding.
Notes
* Correspondence: Robert N. McCauley, Center for Mind, Brain, and Culture, Emory University, 36 Eagle
Row, Atlanta, Georgia 30322. E-mail: philrnm@emory.edu
1 See Lawson and McCauley (1990), Guthrie (1993), Boyer (1994), and Whitehouse (1995).
2 See, for example, Astuti and Harris (2008), Barrett et al. (2001), Bering and Bjorklund (2004), Cohen and Bar-
rett (2008a,b), and Malley and Barrett (2003).
3 See, for example, in anthropology, Abbink (1995), Cohen (2007) and Whitehouse and Laidlaw (2004) and from
work in the history of religions, Vial (2004) and Whitehouse and Martin (2004).
4 Pyysia¨inen (2004) and Malley (2004) discuss sacred texts. Sørensen (2007) offers a cognitive theory of magic.
Hinde (1999) and Boyer (2001) treat the connections between religion and morality, and Slone (2004) addresses
theological variations.
5 For a discussion of the relation between adaptive cognitive dispositions and their various latent susceptibilities,
see Sperber (1996), 66–7.
6 See Barrett (2004) and Bering and Johnson (2005).
7 Churchland (1989).
8 These include ancestors, angels, cherubim, demons, devils, ghosts, gods, saints, seraphim, sorcerers, specters, spir-
its, sprites, warlocks, witches, and wizards, let alone golems or zombies or representations of animals, plants, objects,
and places possessing counter-intuitive properties.




13 Exactly what counter-intuitiveness amounts to and whether or not it can be quantified with sufficient precision
remain points of controversy. See Gonce et al. (2006), Tweney et al. (2006), and Norenzayan et al. (2006). Justin
Barrett (2009) has provided the most detailed, systematic, theoretical account currently available.
14 Rubin (1995).
15 Consider, for example, Burkert’s observation that: ‘There is probably a cluster of factors in evolution and a clus-
ter of functions served by new avenues of communication; functions may also be lost or altered. Nonetheless certain
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persistent and permanent patterns emerge and even seem to control interactions, since all these events occur within
a unique landscape to which they are adapted. What we discern are the tracks of biology followed by cultural
choice (22–3).’
16 Sørensen (2004) explicitly takes up this challenge.
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